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SECURITIES-SECTION 4(2)--OFFER AND SALE OF UNREGISTERED
SECURITIES DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A PRIVATE OFFERING WHERE
PURCHASERS DID NOT IN FACT POSSESS ADEQUATE MATERIAL INFOR-
MATION-Hill York Corp. v. American International Franchises, Inc.,
448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971).
Defendants Gum Freeman, Jack Freeman and T. R. Browne com-
prised all of the officers and shareholders of defendant American In-
ternational Franchises, Inc. (hereinafter "American"), a Missouri cor-
poration which was formed for the purpose of marketing two national
restaurant franchises. Pursuant to the marketing scheme,' six fran-
chise sales centers were established during the first year of operation.
Due to the personal solicitation of defendant Browne, Florida Fran-
chise Systems, Inc. (hereinafter "Florida Franchise") was formed.2
Stock in Florida Franchise was offered and sold to plaintiffs by local
investors in charge of incorporation. No registration statement had
ever been filed as to this stock. Plaintiffs were given exaggerated
reports on the success of the other sales centers and false informa-
tion concerning defendant Browne's business acumen and the required
franchise fee.3 Additionally, plaintiffs were never informed of an
SEC investigation of an earlier franchise scheme established by de-
fendants Gum and Jack Freeman. Plaintiffs subsequently brought suit
in federal court under sections 12(1) and 12(2) of the Securities Act
of 1933,4 alleging that defendants' failure to register violated section 5
1. The marketing scheme contemplated a two-step process: (1) American would
seek out local investors to incorporate a statewide or regional franchise sales center, and
in consideration for the payment of a franchise fee to American, the exclusive right to
sell the franchises would be conferred upon the investors; (2) the local investors
would then sell stock in the corporation to a small number of persons who would be
likely to furnish supplies and services to the restaurants (e.g., an air conditioning com-
pany, a builder, etc.). Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d
680, 684 (5th Cir. 1971).
2. Browne and one William Osborne advertised in local Florida newspapers, seeking
pre-incorporation subscriptions from investors. Three applicants were ultimately chosen
to incorporate Florida Franchise and were required to invest $5,000 apiece in the
venture. These three local incorporators made all contacts and representations be-
tween defendants and plaintiffs, and ultimately sold the stock to plaintiffs. Two of the
incorporators joined plaintiffs in the instant action, but were held by the district court
to be estopped to recover their investments because they served on the board of di-
rectors of Florida Franchise. Id. at 685-86.
3. Id. at 690. See text accompanying note 53 infra.
4. Securities Act of 1933, § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970), provides:
Any person who-
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of the Act,5 and seeking rescission of the stock sales and the return
of their investments. Despite defendants' contention that the offers
and sales were exempted by section 4(2)0 from the registration re-
quirements of section 5, the jury awarded rescission and a return of the
stock purchase monies paid, and assessed punitive damages of $60,000
against American, $15,000 against each of the Freemans, and $10,000
against Browne. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed the rescission award and reversed the award for punitive dam-
ages. Held, an offer and sale of unregistered securities to a small
group of sophisticated but unrelated purchasers does not constitute
an exempt private offering of securities and is open to liability under
both sections 12(1) and 12(2) where material information was
withheld or misstated so that the purchasers did not in fact possess the
requisite information needed to bring their sophisticated knowledge
to bear in deciding whether to invest; punitive damages are not ap-
propriate under either section 12(1) or section 12(2).7
Section 12(1), which provides a remedy for a violation of section 5,
is virtually a strict liability provision.8 In an action under section 12(1)
(1) offers or sells a security in violation of [section 51, or
(2) offers or sells a security ...by the use of any means or instruments of
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by
means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue state-
ment of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission),
and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the
exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission,
shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue either
at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the considera-
tion paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income
received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer
owns the security.
5. Securities Act of 1933, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970), provides in part:
(a) Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, it shall be
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly-
(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or com-
munication in interstate commerce or of the mails to sell such security through
the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise; or
(2) to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate com-
merce, by any means or instruments of transportation, any such security for
the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to make use of
any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate com-
merce or of the mails to offer to sell or offer to buy through the use or medium of
any prospectus or otherwise any security, unless a registration statement has
been filed as to such security. . ..
6. Securities Act of 1933, § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970) provides: 'The
provisions of [section 5] shall not apply to ... (2) transactions by an issuer not
involving any public offering."
7. 448 F.2d at 688-97.
8. Cf. Wonneman v. Stratford Securities Co., [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] CCH
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a defendant's intent and knowledge are entirely irrelevant consid-
erations.' A plaintiff need only allege and prove that (1) no regis-
tration statement was in effect as to the securities, (2) a defendant
sold or offered to sell such securities, (3) some means of interstate
commerce was used in the offer or sale to the particular plaintiff, (4)
the action is not barred by the statute of limitations, and (5) an ade-
quate tender was made by the plaintiff.10
It seemed clear in Hill York that the stock certificates purchased
by plaintiffs were securities within the definition of section 2(1) of
the 1933 Act." The certificates apparently represented interests in
a profit sharing agreement and would thus qualify within the literal
bounds of section 2(1). Also, under SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,'
the certificates would arguably constitute "investment contracts" within
the meaning of that section.' 3 The court in Hill York did not decide
this point, however.
A more entwined issue, and one afforded some moment by the
court, was whether defendants were sellers within the meaning of sec-
tion 12. The plaintiffs had never met defendants and did not purchase
the stock certificates from them. Rather, the purchases were made di-
rectly from the local incorporating investors. Adopting a broad con-
struction of the term seller, however, the court determined that since "but
for" the defendants' activities the plaintiffs would not have purchased
the stock, the defendants were persons who sold or offered to sell
FED. SEc. L. REP. I 91,341, at 93,459 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (good faith belief in counsel's
advice that securities were exempt is no defense to liability in action brought under
§ 12(1)).
9. 3 L. Loss, SECURIIES REGULATION 1693 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as
Loss].
10. Id. Cf. Lennerth v. Mendenhall, 234 F. Supp. 59, 63 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970). Section 2(1) defines a security as
any note, stock, treasury bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of
interest or participation in any profit sharing agreement, . . . investment contract,
. . . or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a "security"
12. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
13. See id. at 298-301. In Howey the Court carefully scrutinized whether the in-
vestor was an active participant in the particular enterprise. Finding that he-was not,
and that money was invested with the expectation of a return of profits, the Court
deemed the financial arrangement to be a security. See SEC v. Joiner Corp., 320
U.S. 344 (1943); United States v. Herr, 338 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1964). While the
plaintiffs in Hill York were to provide services in consideration for the stock certifi-
cates (see note 1 supra), they were not expected to actively participate in managing
the restaurants. Presumably, this aspect would be handled solely by the local in-
corporating investors.
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within the meaning of section 12.14 In so doing, the court rejected what
it deemed the "strict privity" and "participation" concepts" and adopted
the criterion employed in Lennerth v. Mendenhall6 for determining
when a person is a seller within section 12:
[T]he line of demarcation must be drawn in terms of cause and effect:
To borrow a phrase from the law of negligence, did the injury to the
plaintiff flow directly and proximately from the actions of this particular
defendant?
17
Clearly, the defendants were the motivating force behind the Florida
Franchise project. They sought out the local incorporating investors,
provided training and brochures, and rendered advice. "[Tjhe de-
fendants did everything but effectuate the actual sale.' 8  As such,
since the injuries to the plaintiffs flowed proximately from the ac-
tions of the defendants, the latter were held to be sellers within the
statute.' 9
14. 448 F.2d at 693.
15. Id. at 692. Though the court did not define what it meant by the "strict privity
concept," it is evident that it was referring to the well-settled proposition that under
sections 12(1) and 12(2) a purchaser may recover only from his immediate seller.
3 Loss at 1719; Folk, Civil Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts: The
Barchris Case, 55 VA. L. REv. 199, 201 (1969). Notwithstanding this strict privity re-
quirement,- however, the courts have expanded the term "seller" to include brokers,
officers of corporations and advisement services. Id. at 202-03. One concept utilized in
so expanding the statute is the "participation" theory. Courts espousing this view
interpret the statute as compelling defendants to "show that they did not participate in
the sale and not merely that they did not actually sell the securities to [the pur-
chaser]." Wonneman v. Stratford Sec. Co., [1961-1964 Transfer Binder) CCH FED.
SEc. L. REP. 91,034 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
The Hill York court was certainly justified in abandoning the participation concept.
This concept is too broad since it requires defendants to assume the very burden of
proof which plaintiffs are saddled with under section 12:. showing that defendants
are sellers under the statute. See Lennerth v. Mendenhall, 234 F. Supp. 59, 65 (N.D.
Ohio 1964); 3 Loss at 1693.
16. 234 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
17. Id. at 65; cf. Nicewamer v. Bleavins, 244 F. Supp. 261, 266 (D. Colo. 1965):
It is well established that persons other than the owner of a security may be
liable under 12(1). Such persons include brokers or other agents for the seller,
and directors, officers, or controlling persons of a corporation. However, in all
instances where a non-owner has been held liable, his conduct has amounted to
solicitation of the sale. Those decisions simply recognize that a person may sell
what he does not own. This imports a causation test into section 12(1): "But
for" the person's conduct, there would have been no sale. (emphasis added and
citations omitted).
18. 448 F.2d at 693. Cf. Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F.2d 1046, 1053 (2d Cir.
1969), wherein the court determined that officer-directors of the defendant corpora-
tion, though they had knowledge of the sale of unregistered securities, were not sellers
within 12(1) since they did not play an active role in facilitating the sale.
19. 448 F.2d at 693. But cf. Nicewarner v. Bleavins, 244 F. Supp. 261, 266 (D.
Colo. 1965) wherein the court refused to hold an attorney liable as a seller since he
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It was conceded by all parties that no registration statement was in
effect as to the securities. 20  In defense to section 12 liability, however,
the defendants contended that the transactions were exempt from reg-
istration pursuant to section 4(2) of the Act-the so-called private
offering exemption." It is well-established that the burden of proving
the affirmative defense of a private offering is on the defendants. 2
Accordingly, the defendants proffered evidence showing that the Flor-
ida Franchise offering was limited to sophisticated businessmen and
attorneys planning to do business with the new corporation. Addi-
tionally, the defendants asserted that the plaintiffs had access to all in-
formation concerning Florida Franchise.
2 3
The SEC has long asserted that the determination of whether an of-
fering is public or private is a question of fact which depends upon
the circumstances of each case.2 4  While the Hill York court con-
curred with this approach, it went further and, in an ominous note
of judicial abdication, asserted:
Although courts accord a marked deference to the expertise of such an
agency which is charged with broad regulation of a specific field when
reviewing their regulatory action, we do not intimate that their pro-
did not personally solicit the sale, notwithstanding that he had knowledge of plaintiffs'
need for protection, drafted all agreements, gave advice, and knew that no registration
was contemplated. In contrast, in Lennerth v. Mendenhall, 234 F. Supp. 59, 65 (N.D.
Ohio 1964), relied upon by the Hill York court, the defendants had personally
solicited the sale of securities to plaintiffs. In Hill York, the defendants had no
personal contact whatsoever with the plaintiffs. Nevertheless, because they were
deemed the "motivating force" behind the sale, they were determined to be sellers
within the meaning of section 12. 448 F.2d at 693.
The Hill York court also found that defendants fell within the scope of section ,15
of the Act (15 U.S.C. § 77o (1970) which provides for the vicarious liability under
Sections 11 and 12 of certain "control" persons. 448 F.2d at 693-94. Recognizing once
again that defendants were the "motivating force" behind the sale of stock, the court
held that defendants fell within the definition of section 15 control as set forth in SEC
Rule 405, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405(f) (1971):
The term "control" . . . means the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to
direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a person, whether
through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise.
20. 448 F.2d 686.
21. Id. See note 6 supra. It was clear that means of interstate commerce were
used in connection with the offer to sell or the sale of the securities. 448 F.2d at 693.
22. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 126 (1953), citing Schlemmer v.
Buffalo, R. & P. Ry., 205 U.S. 1, 10 (1907); United States v. Custer Channel Wing
Corp., 376 F.2d 675, 678 (4th Cir. 1967).
23. 448 F.2d at 690. The court interpreted defendants' assertion that plaintiffs
had access "to mean that the plaintiffs could have obtained any information they
desired concerning American and the background of the individual defendants if they
had just asked." Id.
24. SEC Securities Act Release No. 285, at 2 (Jan. 24, 1935).
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cedures are binding precedent. However, to be consistent-which is
the constant aim if not the invariable result of the law-and, most
vitally, because we find S.E.C. criteria both legally accurate and mean-
ingfully sufficient for testing the issue, we hold that a jury should con-
sider the factors enumerated below which the S.E.C. considers, together
with the policies embodied in the Act.2
5
The factors noted by the court include: (1) the number of offerees
and their relationship to each other and to the issuer;26 (2) the num-
ber of units offered;27 (3) the size of the offering;2 and (4) the
manner of the offering. 29 These factors can only be evaluated, how-
ever, in light of the statutory purpose of the Act,3" which is "to pro-
tect investors by promoting full disclosure of information thought
necessary to informed investment decisions." 31 Since exempt trans-
actions do not require the protection of the Act, the applicability of
section 4(2) depends on "whether the particular class of persons af-
fected needs the protection of the Act. An offering to those who are
shown to be able to fend for themselves is a transaction 'not involving
any public offering.' "
3 2
The Hill York court correctly recognized that the level of plaintiffs'
sophistication is not necessarily determinative in establishing whether
25. 448 F.2d at 687. In light of the rather stringent interpretation of the private
offering exemption presented by the SEC in its brief before the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit in SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., SEC RFG. L. RaP., No. 127,
A-17, A-18 (Nov. 17, 1971) (see text accompanying notes 57-59 infra), this statement
by the Hill York court portends a unified judicial and administrative stance concerning
the restricted availability of the private offering.
26. 448 F.2d at 687-88. The SEC and the courts have recently disavowed any safe
numerical test in determining whether an offering is public. E.g., SEC v. Ralston
Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953); Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F.2d 1046,
1053-54 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675,
679-80 (4th Cir. 1967); see 4 Loss at 2644-46 (Supp. 1969).
Additionally, the Hill York court noted that relationships between the offerees them-
selves and the issuer and offerees are significant factors in considering whether a pri-
vate offering exists. 448 F.2d at 688. See Orrick, Non-Public Offerings of Corporate
Securities-Limitations on the Exemption Under the Federal Securities Act, 21
U. PrTr. L. REv. 1, 8 (1959).
27. See 448 F.2d at 689, wherein the court noted that the smaller the number of
units offered, the greater the likelihood that the offering will be considered private.
28. Id.
29. Id.
A private offering is more likely to arise when the offer is made directly to the
offerees rather than through the facilities of public distribution such as invest-
ment bankers' or the securities exchanges. In addition, public advertising is in-
compatible with the claim of private offering. Id. (footnote omitted).
30. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124-25 (1953).
31. Id. at 124 (footnote omitted).
32. Id. at 125.
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plaintiffs are able to fend for themselves and are not, therefore, in need of
the protection of the Act."3 The proper criterion is whether the plain-
tiffs are in such a relationship to the issuer -as to have access to the
same information which a registration statement would disclose.
34
This access must be "meaningful" 35 and its existence often depends
upon either the identity of the offerees, 36 or the relationship between
them.
37
In Hill York, the plaintiffs were a diverse and unrelated group at
the time of the offering. They had neither a position of leverage over
the defendants, nor a privileged relationship with them. Nevertheless,
the plaintiffs did have access to information concerning Florida Fran-
chise.33  Arguably, such access was meaningful: "[They] could have
obtained any information they desired concerning American and the
background of the individual defendants if they had just asked."3 9
It was conceded that plaintiffs were sophisticated businessmen and
lawyers, and it would appear that had they requested and received
relevant information concerning Florida Franchise they would have
33. 448 F.2d at 690. See United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d
675, 678 (4th Cir. 1967): "'[Sophistication' is not a substitute for 'access to the
kind of information which registration would disclose."' United States v. Hill, 298 F.
Supp. 1221, 1228 (D.C. Conn. 1969): "The Supreme Court did not intend in Ralston
Purina to exempt all offerings to experienced or sophisticated investors. No investor
can be said to be sophisticated per se ...... But cf. Bowers v. Columbia Gen. Corp.;
336 F. Supp. 609, 624 (D. Del. 1971) (sophistication is relevant in determining plain-
tiffs' need for protection under the Act); Garfield v. Strain, 320 F.2d 116, 119 (10th
Cir. 1963) (the wide business experience of the plaintiffs was a major determination
in finding that plaintiffs did not stand in need of the protection of the Act); Repass v.
Rees, 174 F. Supp. 898, 904 (D. Colo. 1959) (failure to produce evidence that, inter
alia, the buyers were experienced investors was determinative in disallowing private
offering exemption).
34. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 127 (1953): 'The employees
here were not shown to have access to the kind of information which registration- would
disclose."
35. See Brief, supra note 25, at B-6; cf. Israels, Some Commercial Overtones of
Private Placements, 45 VA. L. Rnv. 851, 860 (1959).
36. See, e.g., Garfield v. Strain, 320 F.2d 116, 119 (10th Cir. 1963) (no public
offering where the sophisticated offerees were close acquaintances of the issuer);
Value Line Fund, Inc., v. Marcus, CCII FED. SEc. L. REP. I 91,523, at 94,970
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) (sophisticated mutual fund offerees possessed enough leverage at
bargaining table to stand without need of protection of the Act).
37. See, e.g., Woodward v. Wright, 266 F.2d 108, 115 (10th Cir. 1959) and Camp-
bell v. Degenther, 97 F. Supp. 975 (W.D. Pa. 1951) (close relationship between offerees
was relevant in court's finding of no public offering). See text accompanying notes
39-44 infra.
38. See 448 F.2d at 690.
39. Id.
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been able to fend for themselves in deciding whether to invest4 0
In Bowers v. Columbia General Corp.,4 decided subsequently to Hill
York, the court considered whether lack of actual knowledge vitiates
the private offering exemption. Determining that it does not, the
court noted:
If offerees have access to the relevant data as a matter of practical busi-
ness reality, are reasonably equipped to deal with the information
available to them, and choose not to take full advantage of their 9p-
portunity, I do not think they are within the class which Congress
sought to protect by enacting the Securities Act.
4 2
In Hill York, it was not clear whether the plaintiffs had access "as
a matter of practical business reality." However, an affirmative reso-
lution of this query would have been moot in light of the court's enun-
ciation of a new and more stringent private offering standard:
Obviously if the plaintiffs did not possess the information requisite for
a registration statement, they could not bring their sophisticated knowl-
edge of business affairs to bear in deciding whether or not to invest ...
There is abundant evidence to support the conclusion that the plaintiffs
did not in fact possess the requisite information.
43
Under this standard, defendants who now rely upon section 4(2) must
prove that plaintiff offerees actually possessed information equivalent
to that required in a registration statement. Proof of mere access
is insufficient, at least in the fifth circuit.
In formulating this standard, the Hill York court relied upon the
SEC's interpretation of SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.44:
The Supreme Court's language does not support the view that the
availability of an exemption depends on the sophistication of the of-
ferees or buyers, rather than their possession of, or access to, informa-
tion regarding the issuer ... 45
40. See id.; Bowers v. Columbia Gen. Corp., 336 F. Supp. 609, 624 (D. Del. 1971):
If sophistication or lack thereof is relevant, the focus must be not so much upon
prior experience with the purchase and sale of securities, but rather upon whether
the offerees knew what to look for in, and how to interpret, the available in-
formation concerning the issuer's business and its profit potential. There are, of
course, degrees of sophistication and the men who negotiated the transaction ...
may not be as sophisticated as some other business executives. The term must be
given a realistic business construction, however.
41. 336 F. Supp. 609 (D. Del. 1971) (denying preliminary injunction and ruling,
inter alia, that plaintiffs who had access to corporate information failed to show
likelihood of demonstrating inapplicability of private offering exemption).
42. Id. at 624.
43. 448 F.2d at 690 (emphasis added).
44. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
45. Gilligan, Will & Co., SEC Securities & Exchange Act Release No. 5689 (May 7,




Though various courts had adopted this "either/or" interpretation of
the Ralston Purina opinion,46 no court, prior to Hill York, has ever
espoused that possession of adequate information is requisite to a
private offering. Rather, whether the purchasers had possession of
adequate information has been dealt with only as an evidentiary query
to determine whether the purchasers had access to adequate informa-
tion.
It is submitted that neither the language of the Ralston Purina
opinion nor the purposes of the Act support the strict possession con-
struction afforded by the Hill York court. In Ralston Purina the
employees had no greater access to relevant information than did the
public at large. As such, the Court could not distinguish the need of
the employees from the need of the public at large and accordingly
disallowed the private offering exemption. WVhile possession of ade-
quate information apparently would have vitiated the employees
need, 47 the Court refused to extend the standard this far, and in-
stead, enshrined "access to the kind of information which registration
would disclose" as the proper test.48
The Hill York court clearly could have achieved a proper result
without extending the private offering standard to "possession." The
fact that plaintiffs were a diverse and unrelated group provided one
neans of disallowing an exemption.4 9 An additional means could be
found in defendants' failure to proffer evidence concerning the number
of offerees, rather than the number of ultimate purchasers. Without
such evidence the court would be unable to determine whether the
class needed protection, and would be justified in affirming the lower
court's decision. 5° Further, the defendants were clearly liable un-
der section 12(2) of the Act. 1 Since the private offering exemp-
46. E.g., Hill York, 448 F.2d at 690; United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp.,
376 F.2d 675, 678 (4th Cir. 1967); Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 466
(2d Cir. 1959); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Supp. 1221, 1228 (D. Conn. 1969); Nice-
warner v. Bleavins, 244 F. Supp. 261, 265 (D. Colo. 1965).
47. But see 4 Loss at 2632 (Supp. 1969):
[Tihis says too much if it implies that the exemption is assured, no matter what
the circumstances, by giving each offeree the same information that would be
contained in a registration statement though without the statutory safeguards
and sanctions.
48. 346 U.S. at 127; see id. at 125-26.
49. See notes 35-37 supra and accompanying text.
50. 448 F.2d at 691-92; see Nicewarner v. Bleavins, 244 F. Supp. 261,,265 (D. Colo.
1965); Repass v. Rees, 174 F. Supp. 898, 904 (D. Colo. 1959); SEC Securities Act
Release No. 4552, at 2 (Nov. 6, 1962); 1 Loss at 656.
51. See note 4 supra. In determining defendants' liability under section 12(1), the
court listed four items of material factual information not made available to the
1972]
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tion is not applicable to a cause of action founded upon section
12(2),52 the court need not have discussed the exemption in deter-
mining liability under section 12(2).
By positing possession of adequate information as the keynote stand-
ard in determining the availability of the section 4(2) exemption, the
Hill York court took a significant step toward broadening the scope
of section 12(1). In determining that the plaintiffs did not possess
the requisite information, the court recognized four items of material
factual information not made available to the plaintiffs: (1) a bro-
chure which failed to disclose a current SEC investigation; (2) a
brochure misrepresenting defendant Browne as an expert in capitali-
zation consulting; (3) a brochure misstating the franchise fee; and
(4) a brochure which failed to disclose that the other sales centers
were under investigation by various state securities commissions.58
These same circumstances were the basis for the finding of liability
under section 12(2). 51 Section 12(2), however, affords a scienter
defense:
[A defendant shall be liable] who shall not sustain the burden of proof
that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not
have known, of such untruth or omission. 55
Section 12(1) does not offer such a defense, but rather is a strict
liability provision for the enforcement of section 5 violations. 50 Since
nondisclosure which constitutes a section 12(2) violation is tanta-
mount to non-possession which, under the Hill York standard, dis-
allows a section 4(2) exemption, plaintiff-purchasers who are not
given the requisite information, and who suspect that defendant-issuers
did not know of the nondisclosure, may now choose to file suit under
section 12(1). Defendants will thereby be deprived of the scienter
defense of section 12(2). Transactions which at one time would have
been proscribed only by section 12(2) are now engulfed by the pro-
scription of section 12(1). Under the Hill York construction, sec-
tion 12(2) has been relegated to second-hand status.
plaintiff (see text accompanying notes 52-55 infra). Finding these items to be ma-
terial (see SEC Rule 405, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405(1) (1971) ), misleading (see 3
Loss at 1701-02), and that defendants did not carry the burden of proving a lack
of scienter (see, e.g., Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348, 357 (10th Cir. 1970), the court
held defendants liable also under section 12(2). 448 F.2d at 695.
52. Woodward v. Wright, 266 F.2d 108, 116 (10th Cir. 1959); Moore v. Gorman,
75 F. Supp. 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); 3 Loss at 1699.
53. 448 F.2d at 690-91.
54. See note 51 supra.
55. Securities Act of 1933, § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970). See note 4 supra.
56. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
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RECENT DECISION
The Hill York court's emphasis on possession reveals an additional
and substantially more perplexing problem. While the SEC would
agree that in order to comply with section 4(2) a privileged relation-
ship must exist between the offeror and offerees, it would apparently
disagree that offerees must be given such information as a registra-
tion statement would reveal. In its brief on appeal in SEC v. Con-
tinental Tobacco Co.,57 the Commission argued that:
Continental's dissemination of its prospectus tends to demonstrate that
its offerees were not knowledgeable or sophisticated and that they
lacked meaningful access to corporate information. They had to be
"spoon-fed" selected information through promotional brochures, movies,
slides and meetings.58
Under Hill York, offerees must possess the requisite information and,
if they do not, it must be given to them. However, according to the
SEC's "spoon-feed" doctrine, the very fact that offerees must be given
relevant information indicates their lack of sophistication and meaning-
ful access. This obvious contradiction in theory between the SEC
and the fifth circuit did not come to a boil in the instant case.59 But
until it does, or until the new federal securities code now being pre-
pared under the auspices of the American Law Institute takes effect, 0
practitioners may be hard-pressed to determine how best to effectuate a
private offering exemption for their clients.
Finally, the close relationship which must exist between both the
offeror and the offerees and between the offerees themselves in order
to satisfy the private offering exemption portends a major conflict be-
tween the law relating to the issuance of exempted securities and the
57. 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972).
58. SEC REG. I Rp. No. 144, B-1, B-6 (March 22, 1972). See Lively v. Hirsch-
feld, 440 F.2d 631, 633 (10th Cir. 1971).
59. In Continental, the fifth circuit chose not to consider the SEC's spoon-feed doc-
trine in overruling the district court and finding that defendants had failed to establish
sufficient evidence of a private offering. 463 F.2d at 161. Nevertheless, there is no
cause to believe that the SEC will discontinue espousing this doctrine, and the potential
stringencies of the doctrine should be carefully weighed by counsel advising upon the
merits of a prospective private placement.
In its brief on appeal in Continental, the SEC further asserted that if offerees must
rely on an attorney for advice, this ipso facto evidences their inability to fend for them-
selves and thus their need for protection of the Act. SEC REG. L. REP. No. 144, B-i,
B-5 (March 22, 1972). Though the court failed to consider this point, it should be
noted that the SEC is apparently encouraging prospective investors in complex transac-
tions to forego seeking the advice of an attorney. If so, such advice must be considered
ill-founded, since even the most sophisticated mutual funds find it essential to consult
counsel on most securities transactions.
60. A.L.L, FEDa AL SECURITIES CODE (Tent. Draft No. 1, April 25, 1972).
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recent Rule 144 which now governs the secondary distribution of such
securities.61 Specifically, Rule 144(e) (3) (F) substantially restricts
the resale of securities by a group of persons or affiliates who "agree
to act in concert." Since investors must necessarily be in close con-
cert at the initial issuance in order to comply with the private offer-
ing exemption, 62 it is questionable whether a resale of such restricted
securities will be allowed beyond the restraints of 144(e)(3)(F). Un-
til an official interpretation of "agree to act in concert" is propounded,
it is suggested that counsel be extremely cautious in affording ad-
vice concerning both issuances and secondary distributions.
61. SEC Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1972). This Rule prescribes the circum-
stances under which some holders of some restricted securities may publicly sell those
securities without registration. For an excellent analysis of Rule 144, see GOLDBERO,
PRIVATE PLACEMENTS AND REsRIcED SEcuRITIs § 8.9 et seq. (1972).
62. See notes 26, 36 and 37 supra and accompanying text.
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